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Abstract— Multi-robot cooperation requires agents to make
decisions that are consistent with the shared goal without
disregarding action-specific preferences that might arise from
asymmetry in capabilities and individual objectives. To ac-
complish this goal, we propose a method named SLiCC:
Stackelberg Learning in Cooperative Control. SLiCC models
the problem as a partially observable stochastic game composed
of Stackelberg bimatrix games, and uses deep reinforcement
learning to obtain the payoff matrices associated with these
games. Appropriate cooperative actions are then selected with
the derived Stackelberg equilibria. Using a bi-robot cooperative
object transportation problem, we validate the performance of
SLiCC against centralized multi-agent Q-learning and demon-
strate that SLiCC achieves better combined utility.
I. INTRODUCTION
Robotics at large has been improving at a rapid pace,
and this has resulted in increased demand in applications
ranging from manufacturing [1], to warehousing [2], to
human-populated environments [3]. However, despite the
clear potential for distributed controllers that leverage coop-
eration between multiple mobile robots (e.g., the cooperative
transport of large or heavy objects, see Fig. 1b), the vast ma-
jority of existing techniques are either limited to single-robot
operation or require that each robot perceive the complete
state of the environment [4]. Interestingly enough, model-
free learning-based methods present a promising alternative
to traditional model-based control, in that they are less
reliant on domain knowledge such as kinematic and dynamic
modeling of the system, and that they scale more naturally
with the number of agents.
Notably, reinforcement learning (RL) shows promise for
controlling robotic systems in unstructured environments as
it enables robots to discover useful behaviors simply by
interacting with the environment [5]. However, research in
the field is still at an early stage, and state-of-the-art methods
are often limited by issues such as partial observability,
particularly in multi-agent settings [6]. Learning cooperative
control of multi-robot systems to achieve common objectives
can be difficult in practice due to agents having asym-
metric embodiments and capabilities; for example, robot
participants can be limited by perceptual [7], communicative
[8], locomotive [9], or computational [10] constraints to
different extents. Additionally, agent-specific preferences in
a cooperative setting can inadvertently interfere with the
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(a) Two TurtleBot3 Burger
mobile robots in the Gazebo
simulator.
(b) Two LoCoBot mobile
robots cooperatively transport
an object.
Fig. 1: SLiCC is a novel method designed for cooperative
control of bi-robot systems. In this work, we evaluate the
performance of SLiCC using a pair of simulated robots and
another pair of real robots. The two robots were selected for
their different physical dynamics.
successful accomplishment of the common objective, leading
to unstable learning in naïve multi-agent adaptations of
single-agent RL methods. To help agents make appropriate
decisions in these circumstances, it is critical to utilize well-
assigned cooperation responsibilities without disregarding
agent-specific preferences—this motivates the use of negoti-
ated decision-making processes.
In this paper, we introduce SLiCC: Stackelberg Learning
in Cooperative Control, which uses a novel prosocial–
introspective framework to achieve a common goal in a bi-
agent system. The proposed framework allows for agents
to have different observation scopes, with prosocial and
introspective behaviors assigned to agents based on the
completeness of their state perception.
The main idea behind the prosocial–introspective frame-
work is to provide a link between perception asymmetry
and agent utility, in the context of cooperative control. More
specifically, in order to successfully achieve a shared goal
(e.g., two robots tasked with jointly carrying an object), the
efficient exploitation of inter-agent interaction dynamics and
consequent allocation of learning responsibilities can com-
pensate for partial observability that arises as a consequence
of perception asymmetry.
Deriving these interaction dynamics requires additional
perceptual capabilities, either in terms of perceiving the com-
plete state (e.g., the positions of both robots) or interaction
forces (e.g., tension or compression on jointly-carried ob-
jects). Therefore, the utility of the agent with such additional
perceptual capabilities should be dependent on both agents’
decisions; we refer to this agent as being prosocial—its
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behavior is largely motivated by concerns about obeying
constraints of the common goal. On the other hand, the
agent with only partial state perception has utility that is
only dependent on its own decisions; we therefore refer to
this as the introspective agent—its attention is exclusively on
its own state and utility.
More specifically, SLiCC models the prosocial–
introspective cooperation problem as a partially observable
stochastic game (POSG) composed of Stackelberg bimatrix
games. Decomposing a POSG into Stackelberg bimatrix
games allows the use of the Stackelberg equilibrium at each
decision step to approximate the POSG equilibrium. With
the insight that an agent’s payoff function is equivalent
to their Q-value function, we use deep RL to learn
payoff matrices, capitalizing on the function approximation
capabilities of deep learning to do so even in settings with
continuous state spaces. The Stackelberg equilibrium can
then be derived from the agents’ payoff matrices and used
to inform the agents’ actions, serving as a mechanism for
negotiated decision-making.
Our contributions are as follows:
1) Introduce SLiCC, a method for cooperative control of
bi-agent systems in partially observable settings based
on an asymmetric prosocial–introspective cooperation
framework that links state perception with agents’
decision-making strategies.
2) Provide an improved Stackelberg game–based architec-
ture to enhance the agents’ policy learning capabilities
under POSG settings.
3) Demonstrate that a SLiCC policy learned in simulation
can be used to control real robots without additional
training.
The rest of the paper has the following structure. To
begin with, Section II presents an overview of the relevant
literature. Following a description of the problem setting in
Section III, we elucidate the proposed SLiCC method in Sec-
tion IV: we begin with a brief treatment of POSGs, and then
explain how we bridge the POSG setting and our prosocial–
introspective framework using the Stackelberg equilibrium.
Next, Section V discusses key differences of SLiCC com-
pared with other learning paradigms. The advantages of
SLiCC detailed in this section are consequential in real-world
applications of cooperative control. Section VI follows with
our experimental setup and results. Besides evaluating SLiCC
in simulation, we also validate our proposed method with real
robots. Finally, Section VII concludes the paper and provides
an inventory of future directions.
II. RELATED WORK
Multi-robot cooperative control has traditionally been
pursued from the perspective of control theory [11]–[13].
Indeed, multi-agent scenarios present peculiar challenges and
constraints for RL-based solutions [6], which has limited
their relevance for the field despite recent successes of deep
RL. Methods such as policy search enable robots to learn
complex real-world skills in single-agent settings (e.g., door
opening [14] and map-less navigation [15]). Unfortunately,
it is difficult to extend these methods to multi-robot ap-
plications. Doing so with a centralized learning paradigm
leads to exponentially increasing state and action spaces
[16], and consequently, infeasible computational needs. Con-
versely, agent decentralization–based RL approaches are not
guaranteed to result in stable policies [17]. However, there is
a promising line of research with game-theoretic RL: policy
updates can be based on stochastic game equilibria, with
the goal of improving state-value function estimates and
reducing learning instability. This has been demonstrated as
an effective solution that incorporates agent–agent interaction
in multi-agent RL [18]–[20], and these approaches are seeing
increasing interest across different communities [21]–[23].
Nonetheless, this direction is not without limitations.
Stochastic games typically assume that all agents have com-
plete observations [18]–[20], which is a limiting constraint
for some settings—and in particular for multi-agent applica-
tions. This point provides an opportune segue into partially
observable stochastic games (POSGs), which arise naturally
from asymmetry in agent-specific preferences, cooperation
responsibilities, or observation scopes. In previous work, the
POSG learning process has been approximated with a series
of Bayesian games and common payoffs, using belief spaces
to compensate for missing observations [24]. Methods like
Joint Equilibrium–based Search for Policies (JESP) [25] have
also been used to alternately optimize the agents’ objective.
Improved flexibility in the decentralized learning process
has furthermore been achieved via modeling an opponent’s
policy through recursive reasoning [26].
These works motivate us to further consider how to
coordinate asymmetric agent roles engendered by robots
with different perceptual capabilities. Previous research in
this area attempted to do so by incorporating Stackelberg
games into RL techniques [27]–[29]. Similar approaches
have been applied in human–robot interaction [21] and smart
microgrids [30], but they dictate a common state space for all
agents. Inspired by recent work applying Stackelberg games
to partially observable scenarios [31], we present a novel
improvement for robot learning by integrating Stackelberg
games with POSGs and reducing the prerequisite of complete
state observations through our prosocial–introspective frame-
work. In order to optimize the performance of game-theoretic
RL approaches, we investigate agent roles in a multi-robot
cooperation problem with asymmetric information. In the
rest of the paper, we demonstrate the potential of game-
theoretic RL approaches with SLiCC as an exemplar.
III. PROBLEM SETTING AND GENERALIZABILITY
For convenience, in this work we consider a bi-agent sys-
tem composed of two mobile robots—although the proposed
method can generally be applied to a variety of multi-robot
scenarios. The state of each robot is denoted with a tuple
(xk, yk, θk, vk), where xk and yk are the robot’s coordinates
in the 2-dimensional plane, and θk is the robot’s orientation
about the z-axis. Furthermore, the magnitude of the agent’s
linear velocity vk in the 2-dimensional plane is given by the
L2-norm of the time derivatives of xk and yk.
Accordingly, with aω,kt and a
v,k
t being the actionable in-
crements for angular velocity and linear velocity respectively,
the robots’ dynamics in discrete space (which is the same as
that which is used by the RL agents) is given by:
xkt+1 = x
k
t + v
k
t cos(θ
k
t )∆t+ xk , (1)
ykt+1 = y
k
t + v
k
t sin(θ
k
t )∆t+ yk , (2)
θkt+1 = θ
k
t + a
ω,k
t ∆t+ θk , (3)
vkt+1 = v
k
t + a
v,k
t + vk , (4)
where (·) denotes environment-induced noise (e.g., wheel-
spin) and errors incurred from the discretization of the
dynamics. The robots are given the objective of cooperatively
transporting an object that is beyond the capabilities of a
single robot to carry (see Fig. 1b).
We selected this particular task because it introduces
dynamical constraints that are not explicitly known by all
agents, and it is furthermore a convenient setting to inves-
tigate perception asymmetry. In our setting, the first robot
(i.e., the prosocial agent) can perceive both robots’ state
tuples, but the second robot (i.e., the introspective agent)
can only perceive its own state tuple. We also assume
that the prosocial agent can receive information from the
introspective agent at each decision step.
We elected to demonstrate the merits of our prosocial–
introspective framework with this simple bi-agent system as
it is representative of imbalanced agent roles in a multi-agent
setting. However, it is worthwhile to note that SLiCC is
applicable too in systems with more than two agents: we
can easily add more introspective agents without loss of
generality.
IV. STACKELBERG LEARNING IN COOPERATIVE
CONTROL
In this section, we present the main components of SLiCC
(see Fig. 2 for an outline of the method). As previously
mentioned, we use the POSG model to characterize the
policy learning process due to the difference in observation
scopes between the two agents. The prosocial–introspective
framework allows us to relate this difference to agent utility,
while step-wise Stackelberg equilibria are used to approxi-
mate the POSG equilibrium. Finally, we describe how deep
Q-networks can be used to estimate the agents’ Q-values.
A. Partially Observable Stochastic Game (POSG)
A POSG can be represented by a tuple G, where
G =
{
N , S, (Ok)
k∈N ,
(
Ak
)
k∈N , T,
(
rk
)
k∈N ,
(
pik
)
k∈N
}
.
The elements of G are defined as follows:
• N = {1, . . . , n} is the set of agents;
• S is the set of states, common to all agents;
• Ok ⊆ S is the observation space for agent k;
• Ak is the set of actions available to agent k;
• T : S×A1× · · · ×An → PD(S) is the state transition
function, with PD(·) being a probability distribution,
and with the transition dynamics common to all agents;
Partially	Observable	Stochastic	Game	(POSG)
Stackelberg	Game
Step	2
Step	3
Step	1
Fig. 2: Outline of the SLiCC algorithm. (P : Prosocial Agent,
I: Introspective Agent.) Each decision step t of the POSG
corresponds to a Stackelberg game (see Section IV-C). The
Q-table of each agent is estimated based on its observations.
Step 1: Agent P determines the expected action pair (aPe , a
I
e)
based on its own Q-table; Step 2: Agent P derives the actual
action aP ; Step 3: Agent I determines its actual action aI .
• rk : Ok × A1 × · · · × An → R is the reward function
for agent k; and
• pik : Ok → PD(Ak) is the policy of agent k.
As detailed in Section III, in this work we consider a bi-agent
system consisting of a prosocial agent and an introspective
agent, i.e., N = {P, I}. Therefore, ∀o ∈ Ok, the Stackelberg
equilibrium (piP
∗
, piI
∗
) [27] satisfies Eqs. (5) and (6), for all
piP and piI respectively:
V P
(
o
∣∣∣piP∗ , piI∗) ≥ V P (o∣∣piP , BR(V I , piP )) , (5)
V I
(
o
∣∣∣piP∗ , piI∗) ≥ V I (o∣∣∣piP∗ , piI) . (6)
Here, BR(V I , piP ) = arg maxuI∈AI V
I
(
o
∣∣piP , uI) rep-
resents the best response of Agent I given Agent P ’s policy.
For k ∈ N , V k(·) refers to the discounted episode reward
with observation o at time t,
V k(o) = E
[
T−t∑
i=0
γirkt+i
∣∣∣∣∣ ot = o, (piP , piI)
]
. (7)
Eqs. (5) and (6) essentially state that, when agent k follows
an equilibrium policy pik
∗
, the discounted episode reward
attained is guaranteed to be greater than or equal to that
attained with any other policy. Agent P ’s decision is also
related to the best response of Agent I . In our problem, we
only consider stationary policies
(
pik = pik(s1), . . .
)
.
B. Prosocial–Introspective Framework
Under the POSG setting, each agent makes decisions
based on its observations. The prosocial agent (Agent P ) has
complete observation of the system (i.e. perfect perception),
but the introspective agent (Agent I) only observes its own
state. Specifically for our problem setting, the state of agent
k is sk = (xk, yk, θk, vk). Thus, the observations of the two
agents are oP = (sP , sI) and oI = sI . The reward function
of each agent depends on its observation and action spaces:
rk : Ok ×Ak → R.
C. Stackelberg Game
We use a Stackelberg game formulation as the intermedi-
ary between our prosocial–introspective framework and the
POSG model, as shown in Fig. 2. We express each decision
step of the POSG as a partially observed bimatrix game GSG,
where
GSG(s) = {N , (Qk(·))k∈N , (pik)k∈N , s} . (8)
Here, Qk refers to the payoff matrix of Agent k. Note that
an agent’s payoff matrix is also its Q-table: respectively,
QP
(
oP , aP , aI
)
and QI
(
oI , aI
)
are the Q-values for the
Agents P and I when observing oP and oI [28]. To derive a
Stackelberg equilibrium solution and actions at each decision
step t, the agents use the following steps:
1) Agent P , using its own QP , determines the expected
action pair that maximizes QP :
(aPe , a
I
e) = arg max
uP∈AP
uI∈AI
QP (oPt , u
P , uI). (9)
2) Agent P receives QI from Agent I , and derives an
actual action aP by minimizing the difference between
the Q-values obtained from the actual and expected
action pairs:
aP = arg min
uP∈AP
|QP (oPt , uP , arg max
uI∈AI
QI(oIt , u
I))
−QP (oPt , aPe , aIe)|. (10)
3) Agent I , using its own QI , determines its actual action
aI that maximizes QI :
aI = arg max
uI∈AI
QI(oI , uI). (11)
D. Algorithm Overview
The SLiCC method is described in Algorithm 1. First,
both Agent P and Agent I initialize their respective neural
networks to approximate QP and QI respectively. Then, dur-
ing each episode, the agents use the Stackelberg equilibrium
to guide their action choices, i.e. using Eqs. (10) and (11).
Finally, the agents update their Q-value functions:
QPt+1
(
oPt , a
P , aI
)
= (1− αt) ·QPt
(
oPt , a
P , aI
)
+ αt
[
rPt + γ max
uP∈AP
QPt
(
oPt+1, u
P , F It (o
I
t+1)
)]
, (12)
QIt+1
(
oIt , a
I
)
= (1− αt) ·QIt
(
oIt , a
I
)
+ αt
[
rIt + γ max
uI∈AI
QIt
(
oIt+1, u
I
)]
. (13)
For conciseness of notation in Eq. (12), we have defined:
F It (x) = arg max
uI∈AI
QIt (x, u
I). (14)
From Eq. (13), we see that the Agent I’s policy learning
does not depend on Agent P ’s actions. Conversely, Eq. (12)
shows that Agent P learns to adapt to Agent I during its
Q-value updates. This reinforces our interpretation of the
prosocial–introspective framework: the introspective agent
only focuses on its own state and utility, while the prosocial
agent ensures the common objective is fulfilled by making
adaptive decisions and reconciling actions taken by the intro-
spective agent. Ultimately, the approach allows us to mediate
the agents’ perception asymmetry by means of appropriately
assigning cooperation responsibilities.
V. COMPARISON WITH OTHER LEARNING PARADIGMS
We now discuss several key aspects in which SLiCC
differs from other learning paradigms. We address them with
regard to two main themes: perceptual or communicative
requirements, and time-varying agent-specific preferences.
These have important implications when considering the
design specification and adaptability of a multi-robot system.
A. Perceptual or Communicative Requirements
SLiCC places less emphasis on the capabilities of in-
dividual agents compared to other frameworks. As previ-
ously mentioned, SLiCC does not require all agents to have
complete state observations. This means that we can avoid
equipping introspective agents with the full suite of sensors
typically required for the task. Alternatively, we can reduce
the required communication bandwidth as agents no longer
have to be in constant two-way communications with each
other to share state information. Furthermore, SLiCC oper-
ates with full effectiveness using one-way communications:
introspective agents do not need to receive information from
any other agent.
B. Time-Varying Agent-Specific Preferences
We consider here a situation that can further clarify
some advantages of the proposed SLiCC method. Imagine
a scenario where an agent suffers a mechanical malfunction,
therefore impeding its ability to carry out a certain action as
was originally determined at the design step of the problem.
In such a scenario, it would be beneficial for the agent to
modify its policy to accommodate its diminished capabilities.
1) Independent Learning: With independent learning,
each agent disregards the existence of the other agents, sub-
suming them within the environment. This approach requires
no inter-agent communication, and agents seek to maximize
their individual utilities. While independent learning might
allow to learn satisfactory policies in some multi-agent
settings, it is expected to fail in this scenario given the
additional agent–agent dynamics in the environment.
Algorithm 1 Stackelberg Learning in Cooperative Control (SLiCC)
1: Initialize neural networks Qk(·; θk) with corresponding output size (P : |AP | × |AI |, I : |AI |) and replay buffer D.
2: for episode 1 : M do
3: Initialize state s0 for all agents.
4: for t = 1, . . . , T do
5: P derives expected actions (aPe , a
I
e) = arg maxuP ,uI Q
P (oPt , u
P , uI ; θP ).
6: P and I simultaneously -greedily execute aP and aI respectively:{
aP = arg minuP |QP (oPt , uP , arg maxuI QI(oIt , uI))−QP (oPt , aPe , aIe)|,
aI = arg maxuI Q
I(oI , uI).
7: Both agents add their corresponding transition tuple τkt = (o
k
t , a
k
t , r
k
t , o
k
t+1) to the replay buffer D.
8: for (τP , τ I)i in the mini-batch sample from D do
9: P calculates target as follows: `Pi =
{
rP , if episode terminates;
rP + γmaxuP Q
P (oP
′
, uP , F It (o
I′); θP ), otherwise (see Eq. (14)).
10: I calculates target as follows: `Ii =
{
rI , if episode terminates;
rI + γmaxuI Q
I(oI
′
, uI ; θI), otherwise.
11: Update θk by minimizing the cost (`ki −Qk((ok, ak)i; θk))2.
12: end for
13: end for
14: end for
2) Centralized Learning: Centralized learning utilizes a
single policy to jointly control all agents, managing the
multi-agent system as if it were a single complex agent.
This approach is, in theory, capable of adapting to this
scenario in two ways. First, the learning process can be
designed a priori to accommodate such an eventuality, by
introducing agent-specific preferences explicitly in the state
space; however, doing so for all agents quickly leads to com-
binatorial explosion. Second, the centralized policy can adapt
to the malfunctioning robot’s modified behavior and action
space through learning. Unfortunately, since the centralized
policy’s action space is the Cartesian product of all agents’
action spaces, it will take a long time to converge to the new
policy.
3) SLiCC: Introspective agents in SLiCC are able to
implicitly convey their updated agent-specific preferences in
the form of QI . Following a change in its agent-specific
preferences, an introspective agent can quickly update its
QI since the dimensionality of QI is simply equal to the
dimensionality of its action space. This stands in direct
contrast to the update situation with centralized learning
described above. Upon receiving an updated QI , Agent P
can immediately accommodate the changes in Agent I’s
agent-specific preferences (see Eq. (10)).
VI. EXPERIMENTS AND EVALUATIONS
In this section, we report on the results of our evaluation of
SLiCC with two different reward prototypes. We use SLiCC
to learn a policy for the cooperative transport task in the
Gazebo robotics simulator with a pair of TurtleBot3 Burger
mobile robots (Fig. 6a). As a baseline for comparison, we
also learn a centralized policy (see Section V-B.2) with a
deep Q-network [32], referred to hereinafter as centralized
Q-learning. Our code is publicly available on GitHub1, and
a summary video of our experiments can be accessed at
https://youtu.be/NnuhFeVTcOw.
A. Reward Structure
In our problem, the different characteristics of the agents
provide an advantageous scenario to design reward functions
to cover multiple learning responsibilities. Specifically, one
of the main advantages for our game-theoretic RL approach
is the inclusion of agent-specific preferences [19], denoted
as rap. This component characterizes agent-based concerns,
preferences, or desires, which are not affected by the other
agents or the environment. In addition, a multi-agent system
also needs to carefully balance agent–agent coordination with
the achievement of the common goal—which we hereinafter
refer to as rint and rgoal respectively.
Considering that the prosocial agent has a broader observa-
tion scope, it can respond to the introspective agent’s possibly
unexpected behaviors, without disregarding its agent-specific
preferences or the common goal. We have the following
reward prototypes:
1) RPα: The prosocial agent incorporates the global
goal, agent–agent interaction, and its agent-specific
preferences. The introspective agent focuses on the
global goal and its agent-specific preferences.
rPt (o
P
t , a
P
t ) = r
P
goal + rint + r
P
ap, (15)
rIt (o
I
t , a
I
t ) = r
I
goal + r
I
ap. (16)
2) RPβ : The prosocial agent incorporates agent–agent
interaction and its agent-specific preferences. The in-
trospective agent focuses on the global goal and its
1https://github.com/HIRO-group/SLiCC
agent-specific preferences.
rPt (o
P
t , a
P
t ) = rint + r
P
ap, (17)
rIt (o
I
t , a
I
t ) = r
I
goal + r
I
ap. (18)
In these reward prototypes, rint evaluates the interaction
between P and I: a higher value implies that the two
robots are staying in formation, as is required for cooperative
transport. This term does not contain information about the
global target. Meanwhile, rgoal quantifies the discrepancy
between the current state and the expected goal state. Since
the two agents cooperatively complete one task, the global
goal can be defined based on individual states. Finally, rkap
represents the agents’ preference for smooth consecutive
actions: drastic changes in robot commands might result in
undesirable behaviors (e.g., loss of traction).
RPα and RPβ present two different cooperation plans
of the prosocial agent. Compared to RPα, RPβ reduces
the prosocial agent’s duty towards accomplishing the com-
mon goal and allows it to focus on how to negotiate its
agent-specific preferences and the agent–agent interactions,
while trusting that the limited information available to the
introspective agent will be enough to accomplish the task.
Although the consideration of rkap introduces additional
complexity in the reward landscape and thus complicates the
policy learning process, the equilibrium-based policy updates
of SLiCC provide flexibility to make appropriate decisions.
In our experiment, the target state is starget =
(xtarget, ytarget, vtarget, θtarget). Based on the problem set-
ting and our testbed, we define rap = (rPap, r
I
ap), rint, and
rgoal = (r
P
goal, r
I
goal) as follows:
rint = −‖‖(xPt , yPt )− (xIt , yIt )‖ − σ‖, (19)
rkgoal = −‖(v, θ)kt − (v, θ)target‖, (20)
rkap =
{
µupper, if ‖av,kt − av,kt−1‖ ≤ ζ,
−µlower, else. (21)
Here µupper > 0, µlower > 0, and ζ > 0. The desired
distance between the two agents is denoted as σ.
B. Training Architecture
The neural network structure for Algorithm 1 is shown in
Fig. 3a. Each RL agent has a fully connected neural network
with a single hidden dense layer containing `kden neurons.
The input layer of each network has the same dimensionality
as its corresponding agent’s observation ok. The output size
of each neural network has the same dimensionality as the
corresponding agent’s Q-table (P : `P×`P , I : `I ). Based on
the requirements of our problem setting and testbed, `P =
`I = 9 and `kden = 1024. Relevant hyperparameters used in
learning are: γ = 0.95, and |Dmin| = 64. The parameters
used in the reward are: µupper = 0.05, µlower = 0.02, and
ζ = 0.03. These values were selected via hyperparameter
search, but our empirical experience suggests that SLiCC is
relatively robust to reasonable changes in hyperparameters.
The action space is Atype = {0,−2∆av,−∆av,∆av,
2∆av,−2∆aθ,−∆aθ,∆aθ, 2∆aθ}. For each agent, the ac-
tual action at each decision step is an angular velocity change
Stackelberg
Equilibrium
tanh
D
enseLayer-
tanh
D
enseLayer-
Introspective	Agent
Prosocial	Agent
(a) SLiCC: The prosocial and introspective agents use one
neural network each to approximate their Q-function. Each
network has a single hidden dense layer of size `Pden = 1024
with a tanh activation function. The networks have different
output dimensionality: `P × `P for agent P , and `I for agent
I . In our experiments, `P = `I = 9. The actions are selected
as per Eqs. (9) to (11).
D
enseLayer-
tanh
(b) Centralized Q-learning: The centralized learning network
has a single hidden dense layer of size `centralden = 1024 with a
tanh activation function. The output dimensionality is `c× `c
is the number of output size, with `c = 9. The action pair
(aP , aI) is that which maximizes the Q-value.
Fig. 3: The neural network structures for our experiments.
(aω,kt ∈ Atype) or a linear velocity increment (av,kt ∈ Atype).
In our simulated environment, ∆av = 0.02 and ∆aθ = 0.2.
As alluded to in Fig. 3a, it is relatively easy to increase the
number of agents in the system—we can simply add new
introspective agents in parallel.
Our experiments include two scenarios: Atype + RPα
and Atype + RPβ . Correspondingly, we use centralized Q-
learning with reward rg = rint + r1goal + r
2
goal + r
1
ap + r
2
ap
as the baseline. The neural network structure is shown in
Fig. 3b. There is also a single hidden dense layer with
`centralden neurons. The output is the approximated Q-table
which is a matrix with size `c × `c, where `c = 9.
C. Training Performance
Fig. 4 shows the average reward per episode attained with
SLiCC and centralized Q-learning. Firstly, SLiCC shows
good convergence behavior in our experiments. This val-
idates our prosocial–introspective cooperation framework,
which allows SLiCC to accomplish the common objective
with stabilized learned policies. Despite the system being
constrained by partial observations, SLiCC still demonstrates
good performance. Secondly, after around 1,500 episodes,
SLiCC has achieved better average reward and maintains
this trend until the end of the training process. We can see
that SLiCC takes less time than centralized Q-learning in
reaching the same average reward level. One of the critical
Fig. 4: Average reward per episode for centralized Q-learning
and SLiCC with Atype. Rewards for SLiCC are expressed
as the sum of the rewards of both Agents P and I .
Fig. 5: Success ratio using SLiCC and centralized Q-learning.
reasons that explains why centralized Q-learning has lower
average reward is the mutual interference between the three
reward constituents: rint, rgoal, and rap.
Fig. 5 shows the success ratio across episodes with SLiCC
and centralized Q-learning, for both RPα and RPβ . An
episode is considered to be successful if three conditions are
jointly satisfied:
1) the inter-agent distance is close to the desired distance
σ at all times,
2) agent velocities are close to the target velocity
(v, θ)target at the end of an episode; and
3) the episode length exceeds a minimum duration.
As can be seen, SLiCC achieves a good success ratio which
is equivalent to that of centralized Q-learning. While a
centralized approach might appear to have an advantage in
this experimental scenario because it can command the same
action for each robot, this strategy does not work in practice
due to noise in transition dynamics.
(a) TurtleBot3 Burger mobile
robot (CC BY 4.0).
(b) Yujin Robot Kobuki mo-
bile base.
Fig. 6: We learn a cooperative control policy in the Gazebo
simulation environment with a pair of TurtleBot3 Burger
mobile robots (Fig. 6a). To validate the real-world applica-
bility of the learned policy, we run it on a pair of LoCoBot
mobile robots, built on a Yujin Robot Kobuki mobile base
(Fig. 6b). This introduces different physical dynamics, which
confirms the generalizability of learned SLiCC policies. The
real robots are able to successfully carry out the object
transportation task (Fig. 7).
D. Real Robot Validation
To validate the real-world applicability of SLiCC, we used
the policies learned in simulation to control a pair of real
LoCoBot mobile robots. Notably, the LoCoBot is built on
a Yujin Robot Kobuki mobile base (Fig. 6b), which has
significantly different physical dynamics than the TurtleBot3
(Fig. 6a). After scaling the state and action spaces to approx-
imate the spaces used in simulation, the learned policy was
able to successfully perform the cooperative transport task
without additional training (Fig. 7). This demonstrates the
adaptability of SLiCC to different robotic platforms as long
as appropriate considerations are made to account for differ-
ences in robot dynamics. These considerations include using
generalized dynamics (Eqs. (1) to (4)) and compensating for
any magnitude differences in the state and action spaces.
VII. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
In this work, we introduce SLiCC: Stackelberg Learning
in Cooperative Control, a novel technique to solve the multi-
robot cooperation problem in partially observable scenarios.
Our method links state perception with the agents’ decision-
making strategies through a Stackelberg game–based archi-
tecture, which we integrate with partially observable stochas-
tic games (POSG). Payoff matrices are approximated via
deep reinforcement learning, and the proposed framework
is evaluated using both simulated and real robots.
In Section V, we detailed a number of advantages that
SLiCC has over other learning paradigms. In future work,
we intend to empirically demonstrate these advantages; some
of the potential of the method is still untapped, and we will
investigate other scenarios in which we expect SLiCC to
perform better (e.g., limited communication bandwidth). In a
separate direction, we also plan to explore alternative training
frameworks (e.g., sequential training of the introspective and
prosocial agents) and extend SLiCC to continuous action
spaces. Finally, there are several improvements to SLiCC that
Fig. 7: The pair of real LoCoBot mobile robots carry out the object transportation task using the policies learned on
TurtleBot3 Burger mobile robots in simulation. The photo on the far left shows the initial state of the the LoCoBot mobile
robots. From left to right, the two robots cooperatively transport the object.
hold promise for applications in more complex environments
(e.g., navigating around obstacles); these will also be pursued
in future work.
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